Abstract -This study tests the proposition that firms that make efficient use of their internal capital markets can lower the cost of transacting in the external capital market. Using a large panel data set of diversified firms from 1980-1998, I show that efficient internal capital market users and more diversified firms have a higher propensity to use external capital relative to comparable single segment firms. These results are robust to including other controls, such as measures of information asymmetry, capital needs, relative valuation and firm size. Further, a higher use of external capital by diversified firms relative to single segment firms is associated with a higher excess value, especially for efficient internal capital market users. I also demonstrate the robustness of these findings by employing a sample of firms that experience an increase in expected investment outlays. My findings support predictions from theoretical models, such as Stein (1997) , and emphasize an additional benefit of an efficient internal capital market, namely lower-cost access to external capital.
This paper examines the interaction between internal and external capital markets. For the purpose of this paper, I define an internal capital market as the mechanism by which headquarters allocates capital to the various divisions of the firm. If headquarters allocates investment to the divisions with the highest marginal return, then the firm uses its internal capital market efficiently. The primary question in this study is whether and how a firm's internal allocation is related to its transactions with the external capital market.
Answering this question can help us to better understand how firms finance their investments. Specifically, are there differences between single segment and diversified firms in the sources of financing? What characteristics of diversified firms lead to more or less use of external capital? The answers are important in the light of theories that try to explain the benefits and costs of diversification.
1 A potential benefit of diversification is to establish an internal capital market (ICM). Creating an ICM can have at least two advantages. First, internal resource allocation can be more efficient than allocation performed by the external capital market. This issue is the focus of recent theoretical and empirical research investigating whether diversified firms use their ICMs to efficiently reallocate capital. Theoretical models and arguments predicting an efficiency gain from internal capital allocation are found in Weston (1970) , Williamson (1970 Williamson ( , 1986 , Gertner et al. (1994) and Stein (1997) . Alternative models based on agency conflicts emphasizing the drawbacks of internal allocation are developed by Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000) . Empirical tests of these models by Lamont (1997) , Shin and Stulz (1998) , Scharfstein (1998) and Rajan et al. (2000) , among others, suggest that capital is reallocated internally, but that, on average, the reallocation is inefficient.
A second potential advantage of an ICM is its effect on transactions with external capital markets (ECM). Stein (1997) analyzes the interaction between internal capital allocation and the use of external capital. With information asymmetries and agency problems between managers and outside investors, firms might be credit constrained. If managers are empire builders, they will always invest all the cash available to them, but they will still efficiently allocate funds internally such that their empire reaches the maximum size. Therefore, establishing an ICM can lead to a reduction in agency costs with respect to transactions in the ECM. Information asymmetry problems can also be reduced through an ICM. An external investor bases her decision about how much to lend to a firm on her estimate of the firm's value-maximizing investment needs. According to the law of large numbers, the precision of the estimate of the optimal amount of capital increases with the number of projects in the firm if the projects' capital needs are imperfectly correlated. Thus, lending to a headquarters that oversees a portfolio of projects with imperfectly correlated capital needs, i.e., a diversified firm, is different from lending to a portfolio of single segment firms in that information asymmetry problems are less important.
Therefore, diversified firms with efficient ICMs and firms with larger ICMs, i.e., firms with more divisions and lower correlation of divisional investment opportunities, should be able to use more external capital.
Firms with such ICM characteristics that use more external capital are expected to be valued higher because they underinvest less and can raise external capital at a lower cost than single segment firms. However, inefficient ICM users should not be able to access more external capital because they do not have or do not use superior inside information about their projects. Thus, an outside investor should not be willing to invest more capital in such firms, since headquarters does not allocate the capital in a value-maximizing fashion. In light of these arguments, it is important to investigate empirically whether firms with efficient ICMs use more external capital and whether doing so increases firm value. Such an analysis will further our understanding of the potential costs and benefits of diversification.
I test the above arguments in two ways. First, I employ a panel of diversified Compustat
firms from 1980-1998. To measure a diversified firm's relative propensity to use external capital, I compute net external capital raised, which subtracts external capital returned to outside investors from external capital raised from outside investors. This measure is then adjusted by comparing it to the median net external capital raised by similar single segment firms. I call this measure the excess net external capital (EEC) raised. In a regression framework, I relate EEC to the efficiency of the ICM, the size of the ICM, measures of information asymmetry, growth opportunities, internal capital available, and the firm's size and relative valuation. I find that more efficient ICM users and more diversified firms use more net external capital than comparable single segment firms. In addition, measures of information asymmetry are less negatively correlated with the use of external capital if the firm is an efficient user of its ICM. Further, I use Berger and Ofek's (1995) excess value measure and find that EEC is positively related to excess value, especially for firms classified as efficient users of their ICMs and firms with larger ICMs. The positive correlation between the use of external capital and firm value supports the notion that diversified firms are raising external capital to invest in a firm-value-increasing manner. The finding that firms classified as efficient users of their ICMs and firms with larger ICMs display an even more positive correlation between EEC and excess value suggests that characteristics of the ICM are an important determinant of the way firm value is affected by the use of external capital. The inferences from the first part of the paper, using panel data on all diversified firms, strongly 1 For an overview, see Campa and Kedia (1999) . support the predictions from Stein's (1997) model that firms with efficient ICMs and firms with larger ICMs can raise more external capital and that doing so increases firm value.
Many theoretical models investigating the use of external capital rely on the assumption that a new, positive-NPV project arrives unexpectedly and that the entrepreneurs' wealth and/or the firm's internal funds are insufficient to cover the investment (e.g., Myers (1977) , Myers and Majluf (1984) , Li and Li (1996) , Stein (1997) ). In order to mimic more closely the setting in which these models are specified, I select a sample of diversified firms that operate in industries that receive a positive shock to investment opportunities, proxied by industry median q. To ensure that the change in q does not merely reflect a surprise in current cash flow, I require that the industry's median cash flow remain constant. This setting provides a natural experiment to investigate whether diversified firms that receive an unexpected valuable project use more or less external financing than comparable single segment firms. I find that increases in ICM efficiency and increases in the size of the ICM between the year before and the year of the shock are positively related to changes in EEC. In addition, changes in information asymmetry have a less negative impact on a firm's use of external capital if the firm is an efficient user of its ICM.
Further, changes in EEC are positively related to changes in excess value, especially for efficient ICM users. The evidence from the industry shock sample suggests that ICM characteristics are important determinants of a diversified firm's ability to capture new growth opportunities by allowing the firm to use more external capital. These findings highlight an additional, related advantage for firms with an efficient ICM, namely easier access to external capital.
Prior empirical research on the interaction between internal and external capital markets includes Comment and Jarrell (1995) , Billett and Mauer (1999) , Hadlock et al. (1998) , and Fee and Thomas (1999) . The study most similar to mine is Comment and Jarrell (1995) , who test Williamson's (1970 Williamson's ( , 1975 Williamson's ( , 1986 argument that firms with ICMs transact less in the external capital market. They find that, on average, diversified firms raise less external capital but return more to their outside investors, and they conclude that there is no clear evidence that diversification leads to less reliance on external capital markets. However, basing the conclusion purely on average comparisons between diversified and single segment firms is problematic in the light of findings by Rajan et al. (2000) and Scharfstein (1998) who show that firms are on average allocating capital inefficiently and by Berger and Ofek (1995) who find a valuation discount for the average diversified firm relative to single segment firms. I extend Comment and Jarrell's analysis in several ways. First, I investigate the effects of ICM characteristics such as size and efficiency on a firm's use of external capital. Second, I compare diversified firms to their single segment peers. Third, I control for other factors that may influence the use of external capital. Fourth, I relate the use of external capital to firm value. Billett and Mauer (1999) find that diversified firms can increase firm value if capital is transferred to segments with above-industry-average return on assets that would be financially constrained if the divisions were single segment firms. However, their study does not analyze whether the transfers were made due to relaxed credit constraints at the firm level or whether free cash flow from other divisions was reallocated. Hadlock et al. (1998) document that more diversified firms have a less negative 2-day seasoned equity offering (SEO) announcement return and raise, on average, more capital per issue. My results are consistent with their findings and also suggest that the characteristics of internal capital markets are a driving force behind their findings. Fee and Thomas (1999) show that diversified firms have lower measures of information asymmetry. They link those measures directly to excess value and find a negative relationship.
My findings suggest that efficient ICM users can reduce the cost of information asymmetry.
Therefore, besides the direct effect on pricing, there should also be an indirect effect through the firm's ability to raise more external capital.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section briefly reviews underlying theories for my tests. Section II describes the sample, the tests, and the results for the panel data set. In Section III, I describe tests and show results for the industry shock sample.
Conclusions follow.
I. Underlying Theories
In a world with perfect markets, it does not matter whether investment is funded by internal or by external capital markets. However, the source of financing can matter in the presence of informational asymmetry and agency problems. Stein (1997) If a diversified firm owns both projects, the external investor determines the optimal investment by computing the expected NPV per project for 2, 3 or 4 units of total capital raised.
Under the assumption that outcomes are independent across projects, the value of having an ICM can be easily computed. If the external investor invests 2 units, the expected NPV is the probability weighted average of the projects' returns. The assumption that headquarters allocates funds to the project with the highest marginal return, i.e., ICM efficiency, is now important in determining the expected NPV, which is 2(1 -p) 2 y 1 + 2p 2 θ y 1 + 2p(1 -p)θ y 2 -2 = 0.65. Per project, the expected NPV is 0.325, which is larger than the 0.32 that could be expected from a single segment firm realizing a project.
2 If the external investor invests 3 units, the expected NPV
68. Per project, the expected NPV has increased to 0.34. The additional increase in value is due to the fact that, on average, more positive NPV projects can be realized and only in one instance (both projects in the bad state) is there more overinvestment compared to the previous scenario. As long as the expected benefit from realizing more positive NPV projects is bigger than the cost of overinvesting, a diversified firm can relax credit constraints relative to single segment firms. If the diversified firm was allowed to raise 4 units, however, the expected NPV would drop to 0.56, which results in an expected NPV per project of only 0.28. In this case, no reallocation occurs because each project is always investing 2 units and a diversified firm is not more valuable than two separate singleproject firms.
Thus far, the example has shown that a diversified firm with an efficient ICM can use more external capital and increase firm value. The increase in firm value has two sources. First, the ability to transfer funds to the highest marginal return project (winner picking) is valuable. The expected NPV per project increases from 0.32 for a single segment firm to 0.325 for a diversified firm with an efficient ICM purely by combining two projects. Second, combining two projects under the supervision of one headquarters can result in lower costs of information asymmetries.
In the example, the expected NPV per project of 0.325 in a diversified firm with 2 units of investment increases to an expected NPV per project of 0.34 if the diversified firm receives 3 units of investment. This increase in value reflects a reduction in the cost of information asymmetry. 3 Note that this benefit only exists if the firm is using its ICM efficiently. Only then can the external investor benefit from headquarters' superior information by delegating the investment allocation decision to management. To see this, assume the CEO has a pet project in which she always invests 2 units, regardless of the project's outcome. If the firm could raise 3 units of investment, then the expected NPV of the firm would be 0.60. Per project that is an expected NPV of 0.30, which is lower than for a single project firm getting only 1 unit of investment per project. Hence, efficient internal allocation is an important characteristic of an ICM with respect to transactions in the external capital markets.
Allowing headquarters to increase the number of projects under its control makes it even easier for outside investors to invest in the diversified firm. Assume an extreme case in which a diversified firm owns 100 projects and each project's outcome is independent. According to the law of large numbers, an external investor would now expect roughly 50 projects in the good state and 50 in the bad state. She would be willing to invest almost at the first-best level of, on average, 150 units. Therefore, a firm with a larger ICM should be able to use more external capital. 3 The numerical values in this example are chosen to show the main determinants of the interactions between internal and external capital markets. Allowing for correlation in projects' outcome (i.e., capital needs), differences in projects' returns between the good and bad outcome and different ex ante outcome probabilities will affect the probability that the diversified firm can raise more external capital relative to single segment firms, unless the diversified firm can own more than two projects. Note that if the ex ante expectation of the good state occurring is high enough that overinvestment is cheaper than underinvestment, external investors will not impose credit constraints on single project firms. Under this assumption, a diversified firm might receive less external capital by increasing the number of projects under one roof.
While this example is clearly a simplified version of investment allocation, it serves to highlight that firms with efficient ICMs and larger ICMs (more divisions, and divisions with lesscorrelated outcomes) should be able to relax some of the credit constraints otherwise imposed on single segment firms and reduce the cost of information asymmetries. It also shows that the perproject value of the diversified firm that raises more external capital should be higher than that of both a diversified firm that does not raise more external capital and a single project firm. Li and Li (1996) argue that if diversification reduces cash flow volatility, the likelihood of over-and underinvestment is reduced and cash flows are more certain to cover the existing debt.
Therefore, newly raised external funds are less likely to be used to pay existing debt. This implies that a diversified firm that has to finance a new, positive-NPV project with external capital before the existing debt is due is more likely to receive external financing than is a single segment firm for a similar project. Stulz (1990) and Froot et al. (1993) have made a similar argument. Fluck and Lynch (1999) report that firms acquire marginally profitable single segment firms that cannot find external financing as stand-alone firms due to agency problems. Within a diversified firm, however, the conglomerate can raise funds sufficient to finance the marginally profitable segment. Thus, diversified firms should be able to raise more external financing than comparable single segment firms, and this should be value enhancing, even though diversified firms might trade at a discount relative to their industry median peers.
Matsusaka and Nanda (2000) model a firm's need to raise external capital for different levels of internal resources. They assume a fixed deadweight cost of external capital independent of whether a diversified or single segment firm raises capital. In their model an ICM is valuable because it allows the diversified firm to avoid external financing in more instances than single segment firms. However, there are cases where internal capital is insufficient and diversified firms raise more external capital than comparable single segment firms, and doing so is valuable. 
II. Panel Data Sample

A. Sample Selection
I use all firms listed on Compustat's industry segment files (including research files) for 1980-1998. Firms with incomplete segment information on sales, assets or capital expenditures are dropped, as are firms with segments in the one-digit SIC codes of 0, 6 or 9. 4 Firms with sales less than $10 million are also excluded. 5 Following Berger and Ofek (1995) , I require the sum of the segment sales to be within 1% of the net sales for the firm and the sum of the segment assets to be within 25% of the firm assets. I apply a multiple to the remaining segment assets, such that the sum of the recomputed segment assets adds up to total assets. I further restrict the sample to firms with complete information on market value of equity and cash flow statement items. 
B. Determinants of the Use of External Capital
According to Stein (1997) , the key drivers of a firm's use of external capital are the efficiency of the ICM, the size of the ICM, and the degree of information asymmetry. In addition, the amount of external capital raised can be affected by a firm's need for capital, its relative valuation, and its size. 
B.2. Measures of the Size of the ICM
The numerical example in section 2 shows that increasing the number of projects within a diversified firm allows it to approach the first-best level of investment.
I measure the size of the ICM as the number of business segments a firm reports. The more segments a firm has, the more external capital it should be able to raise, holding everything else constant. In my sample, the average number of segments per firm is 2.65 (not tabulated).
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An alternative measure of the degree of diversification is the Herfindahl index. This measure incorporates differences in segment size and is potentially a better measure of a firm's potential to reallocate capital than the number of segments. In the numerical example both projects were of equal size, but it can be easily shown that an increase in the size (i.e., capital need) of one project and a reduction in the size of the other diminishes the benefits of diversification. The limiting case is a two-project firm where the large project makes up 100% of the firm's capital needs. I use the inverse of the Herfindahl index based on segment sales.
12 A higher value of this variable corresponds to a firm with more segments or segments of more equal size. Table I shows that the average inverse Herfindahl index is 1.78.
The second aspect of the size of the ICM is the dependence of the projects' outcomes, i.e., their capital needs. In the numerical example in section 2, the project outcomes were independent.
The benefit of diversification decreases as the project outcomes become more positively correlated. The larger the differences in the segments' investment opportunities, the greater is the value that headquarters can add by reallocating capital to the high growth segment and alleviating credit constraints. Matsusaka and Nanda (2000) support this prediction. They show that the possibility of reallocating capital in an ICM is a real option that increases in value with the mean and variance of the investment opportunities of the divisions. I use the coefficient of variation in q as a proxy for the dependence of the projects' outcomes. The coefficient of variation in q is defined as the standard deviation of imputed segment q standardized by the average imputed segment q. 13 The median, reported in Table I , is 0.106 and is significantly different from zero.
The disadvantage of the coefficient of variation in q is that it does not directly control for differences in the size of the segments. Therefore, I include both the inverse of the Herfindahl index and the coefficient of variation in q as independent variables in the regression models.
As an alternative measure of project dependence, I use the diversity of investment opportunities. Following Rajan et al. (2000) , diversity is defined as the standard deviation of the segment asset-weighted imputed q divided by the equally weighted average imputed segment q.
Diversity combines both the dependence of the projects' outcomes and the relative size of the different divisions into one variable. I find a significantly positive median for diversity of 0.286 (Table I) . A higher value of the variable can indicate more segments, less dependence in the segments' investment opportunities, or segments of more equal size. Although Stein's (1997) model predicts that greater diversity leads to higher use of external capital, evidence in Rajan et al. (2000) suggests that greater diversity has costs associated with it. Therefore, it is difficult to come up with an unambiguous prediction for the effect of diversity on EEC. Stein (1997) shows that it is critical that headquarters be good at distinguishing between good and bad projects and that the internal allocation be efficient. An ICM is considered efficient if investment is allocated to the projects/segments with the highest marginal return. Only if the firm uses its ICM efficiently can the problem of information asymmetry between management and outside investors credibly be alleviated. Thus, an efficient ICM should lead to a higher use of 13 Segment-imputed Tobin's q is computed as the single segment firm median Tobin's q in a given year, at the 3-digit SIC code level. Tobin's q here is defined as the ratio of market value of assets standardized by the book value of assets. The market value of assets is computed as the market value of equity plus the external capital. However, in some firms, internal allocation might be inefficient if headquarters does not know or does not act optimally on its information about which projects are going to be successful. In this case, an ICM would not be expected to alleviate information asymmetry problems between managers and external investors.
B.3. Measures of ICM Efficiency
I use two proxies to measure the efficiency of the ICM. The first measure is the relative value added by allocation (RVA) introduced by Rajan et al. (2000) . I compute RVA as follows:
( ) capital to segments with better-than-firm-average investment opportunities and invests more than single segment peers do in those segments.
A second measure of the efficiency of internal allocation, used by Peyer and Shivdasani (2000) , is q-sensitivity of investment. q-sensitivity is defined as follows:
book value of assets minus the book value of equity minus deferred taxes. If deferred taxes are missing, I assume they are zero.
, where q j is the imputed Tobin's q of segment j and q is the segment sales-weighted q j s of the firm. Capex is the capital expenditures of the segment, and Firm Capex is the capital expenditures of the firm. This measure is positive if a segment with a q above the firm's average q has an above-firm-average investment ratio (capital expenditures/sales) and a segment with below-average q has a below-firm-average investment ratio. Therefore, q-sensitivity indicates whether headquarters has invested relatively more in the high-q segments of the firm and relatively less in the low-q segments based on the firm's available resources.
The two measures of ICM efficiency use capital expenditures to proxy for segment investment. Because the amount of capital expenditures is in part determined by a firm's use of external capital, the proxies for ICM efficiency are potentially simultaneously determined with my proxy for a diversified firm's use of external capital. To alleviate this problem, I use lagged values of the measures of ICM efficiency as instruments. Table I shows univariate statistics RVA and q-sensitivity. Both variables have a median of zero, and a mean of 0.00003 and 0.00117, respectively, for diversified firms.
14 For single segment firms, these measures are always zero by definition.
B.4. Measures of Information Asymmetry
Myers and Majluf (1984) demonstrate that due to information asymmetry problems, positive NPV projects are sometimes passed up if risky external capital had to be raised for their realization. Thus, I expect a negative relation between the degree of information asymmetry and a firm's use of external capital.
In Stein's (1997) model, diversification helps to overcome some of the information asymmetry problems if the internal allocation is performed efficiently. In the framework of the numerical example in section 2, the diversified firm could raise more external capital even though the external investor did not know more about the probability of the success of a project under headquarters' control than she knew about the likelihood of success of a project owned by a single project firm. However, the external investor had a more precise estimate of the diversified firm's overall capital needs than she had for two separate single project firms. Thus, ceteris paribus, financial claims issued by a diversified firm are less sensitive to information asymmetry problems than are claims issued by a single segment firm if the diversified firm uses its ICM efficiently. To test this, I create a dummy variable (RVADUM t-1 ) that is equal to one if RVA at the beginning of the year (t-1) is greater than or equal to zero and interact it with a proxy for information asymmetry.
I use several measures for the degree of information asymmetry. First, I use the lagged ratio of intangibles to total assets, expecting it to be negatively related to EEC. The advantage of this ratio is that it is not affected by prices set in the external capital market, i.e., using this proxy, it should be possible to identify the degree of information asymmetry that exists between managers and outside investors.
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A second set of proxies is based on prices. Following Dierkens (1991) and Fee and Thomas (1999) , I compute residual variance and total variance of the daily stock returns over a calendar year prior to the fiscal year-end. I use a market model to extract daily residual returns and compute the variance over all of the available daily residual returns. The CRSP value-weighted index, including dividends, is used as a proxy for the market return. As shown in Table I As a third set of proxies, I use IBES analysts' forecasts about a firm's earnings per share. I construct a standardized measure of analysts' forecast dispersion using the standard deviation of the one-year-ahead forecast of earnings per share standardized by the absolute value of the average forecast. A higher value of this measure is expected to indicate greater information asymmetry because it reflects a wider range of forecasts about the future earnings of a company.
The standardized analysts' forecast dispersion could be computed for only 4,021 firm-years. For 3,370 firm-years, IBES information is missing. Another 1,147 observations are lost because only one analyst's forecast is available and no standard deviation can be computed.
B.5. Measures of Capital Need
Stein's (1997) theory is based on the assumption that an entrepreneur has to raise external capital for his projects because the financing needs exceed his personal wealth. Internally generated cash flow from previous years is exogenous to the model. Matsusaka and Nanda (2000) show that higher levels of internal capital reduce the need for costly external capital. As a proxy for internal capital available to the firm, I compute excess internal cash flow. Internal cash flow is defined as net cash flow from operations minus dividends. Excess internal cash flow is computed in a similar way as EEC. 16 I expect a firm with more excess internal cash flow to cover more of its capital needs with internal capital. Hence a negative relation between excess internal cash flow and EEC is expected, holding everything else constant. Table I shows that the median of excess internal cash flow is significantly positive for diversified firms. Further, both median and mean excess internal cash flow are higher for diversified firms than for single segment firms.
The need for capital is also determined by the available growth opportunities. As a proxy for growth opportunities, I use the firm's Tobin's q at the beginning of the period. I expect firms with a higher q to be in greater need of capital, holding everything else constant. One complication in using q is that it might also be a proxy for information asymmetry. If so, one would expect a negative relation between q and EEC.
B.6. Measures of Relative Valuation
Myers & Majluf (1984) show that firms that are overvalued are more likely to issue risky new securities. Findings by Lucas and McDonald (1990) , Asquith and Mullins (1986) , Mikkelson and Partch (1986) , and Jung et al. (1996) confirm that firms are more likely to issue new securities when their relative valuation is high. I use the stock return over the prior fiscal year and lagged excess value as proxies for relative valuation. I follow Berger and Ofek (1995) , and define excess value as follows:
, and
where V is the sum of market value of equity and book value of assets less the book value of equity and deferred taxes, I(V) is the imputed firm value, Sales i is segment i's sales, M i (V/Sales) MS is the sales multiplier (calculated as the median of the single segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code industry), and n is the number of segments per firm. An alternative way to compute excess value is developed by Lang and Stulz (1994) . They compute excess value as the difference between Tobin's q of the diversified firm and the segment asset weighted average of imputed segment qs. Their imputed q is the average of the single segment firms' qs. I compute the log of the ratio of the firm's Tobin's q to the sum of segment sales-weighted imputed qs. The imputed qs are median qs of single segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code industry. A positive 15 Proxies based on prices can be lower either because the firm is well enough diversified such that the cost of information asymmetry is reduced or because information asymmetry actually is lower. 16 For a detailed description, see Appendix 1. Note that none of the variables used to compute EEC is also used to compute excess internal capital. Section II.D reports regression results using alternative definitions. relation to EEC is expected if higher stock returns and excess values indicate higher relative valuations.
B.7. Measures of Firm Size
If there are fixed costs in transacting in the external capital market (Smith (1986) ), then larger firms will have a transaction cost advantage and should be able to obtain more external capital. I use the logarithm of lagged book value of assets and of lagged sales as proxies for firm size. Table II reports the regression results of equation (1) with EEC as the dependent variable. I employ firm fixed-effects regressions. This technique is appropriate for panel data and alleviates problems with firm specific correlated omitted variables since those are averaged out by the firm fixed-effect. In addition, I include year dummy variables to control for the time variation in firms' use of external capital that might be caused by macroeconomic factors. Models 1-3 show results using different measures of the size of the ICM. In model 1 the coefficient on the inverse of the sales-based Herfindahl index is 0.021 and significant at the 1% level. In model 2 the coefficient on the number of segments is 0.022 and significant at the 1% level. In both models, the variation in q has a positive coefficient of 0.014, which is also significant at the 1% level. In model 3, however, I find that diversity is not significantly related to EEC (0.019). As mentioned earlier, Rajan et al. (2000) note that the diversity variable incorporates agency problems and a higher value does not necessarily indicate a more valuable ICM. In summary, the measures of ICM size strongly support Stein's (1997) predictions that a larger ICM with more independent divisions leads to a higher use of external capital relative to comparable single segment firms.
C. Results
The coefficients on the proxies for ICM efficiency are also always positive. Model 1 includes the relative value added by allocation (RVA), which has a coefficient of 0.286 and is significant at the 10% level. Model 4 uses q-sensitivity instead and finds a marginally significant positive coefficient of 0.134. The point estimate on RVA in model 1 suggests that a one-standarddeviation increase (0.0195) in RVA increases EEC by 0.0056. Since the median EEC in the sample is -0.0055, a one-standard-deviation increase in RVA for the median firm basically eliminates the difference between diversified and single segment firms. Firms with a more efficient ICM are able to use more external capital, as predicted by Stein (1997) .
To test whether these findings are affected by merger and acquisition activities, I restrict the sample to the 7,035 firms that report the same number of segments in two consecutive years.
Model 7 shows that the coefficient on RVA is 0.291 and significant at the 10% level. None of the inferences drawn from the full sample change. The finding that changes in the number of segments do not significantly influence the results supports Schlingemann et al. (2000) who find that ICM inefficiency is not a significant factor in determining which firms divest a segment and what segment of the firm is divested.
The measures of information asymmetry are expected to be negatively related to EEC. In model 1, the residual variance and lagged ratio of intangible assets to total assets both have marginally significant negative coefficients. Also, total variance is negatively related to EEC, as shown in model 5. This evidence is consistent with the predictions of Myers and Majluf (1984) , among others. Of specific interest for my tests is whether diversified firms with a more efficient ICM display a less negative sensitivity to information asymmetry. Model 6 reports that the coefficient on the lagged ratio of intangibles to total assets is significantly negative (-0.123).
However, the coefficient on the interaction variable between the lagged ratio of intangibles to total assets and RVADUM t-1 is significantly positive (0.265). Model 8 shows that the standardized analysts' forecast dispersion is significantly negatively related to EEC, with a coefficient of -0.003. 17 The coefficient on the interaction variable between the standardized analysts' forecast dispersion and RVADUM t-1 is significantly positive (0.001). 18 The finding that the interaction variables display a positive correlation with EEC is consistent with the notion that efficient ICM users can overcome some of the information asymmetry problems in transacting with the external capital markets.
The proxies for need for capital are excess internal capital and beginning of the year Tobin's q. Excess internal capital is significantly negatively related to EEC in every model. The coefficient of -0.642 in model 1 suggests that a firm that has one dollar more internal capital than a comparable single segment firm will use about 64.2 cents less external capital than its single segment peers. Tobin's q is not significantly related to EEC. It seems plausible that it is also a proxy for information asymmetry, and thus could be expected to have a negative correlation with EEC.
As expected, the coefficients on the measures of relative valuation are positive in most models. In model 1, the lagged annual stock return has a coefficient of 0.030 and is significant at the 1% level. Lagged excess values are not significantly related except in model 10, in which I use the Lang and Stulz (1994) 
D. Robustness
This section investigates the robustness of findings presented in Table II by employing a different econometric method and by using different definitions of the dependent variable. The exact definitions of the alternative dependent variables are given in Appendix 1. Table I reports their univariate statistics.
D.1. Econometric Methodology
As an alternative to using firm fixed-effects regressions to address the problem of serially correlated errors in panel data, I also estimate equation (1) using the Fama and MacBeth (1973) methodology. To account for the firm fixed-effect, I subtract the time-series average of each variable from each observation. I run regressions year-by-year, report the average coefficients and use the time-series standard deviation of the coefficients to compute their significance levels. The results are reported in model 1 of Table III . The coefficients and their significance levels are very similar to those reported in model 6 of Table II . None of the above conclusions are affected.
However, the coefficient on Tobin's q is now significantly positive, whereas the coefficient on residual variance decreases and is significant at the 1% level. 19 Results from a cross-sectional regression of time-series averaged variables per firm (between estimates) obtain, except for the coefficient on 1/Herfindahl index, which is insignificantly negative (not shown).
D.2. Excess Net External Capital with Dividends and Interest
EEC, as defined thus far, does not consider dividends and interest payments as a decrease in external capital. In model 2 of Shleifer and Vishny (1992) show that selling assets in a depressed industry can lead to relatively low sales prices because asset markets become very illiquid. Schlingemann et al. (2000) find evidence that asset market liquidity is an important determinant of which segments are sold. In addition, Gertner et al. (1994) demonstrate that diversified firms, especially those with efficient ICMs, can redeploy poorly performing assets internally and therefore reduce their transactions with the asset market. Thus, an efficient ICM user is expected to raise more external capital in the financial markets but raise less capital by transacting in the asset markets. I use the sum of the Compustat items 'sale of property, plant and equipment' and 'sale of investment' as a proxy for asset sales, add it to net external capital raised, re-compute EEC and show the regression results in model 3 of Table III . The main difference from the regression using the base definition of EEC is that the coefficient on RVA is no longer significantly positive. Thus, the asset market appears to be used differently by efficient ICM firms and single segment firms. However, a complete evaluation of these differences is beyond the scope of this paper.
D.4. Increases and Decreases in External Capital
All of the models above net out increases and decreases in external capital. A net measure is preferred because pure capital structure changes and debt refinancings are not treated as changes 20 The main reason for excluding dividends is that they are a strong commitment and changes are very costly (Shyam-Sunder and Myers (1999) ). This potential complication will become important in testing the relation between EEC and firm value since firms with higher dividends would display a lower EEC. Miller and Rock (1985) demonstrate that an increase in dividends is viewed as a positive signal regarding firm value. Denis et al. (1994) empirically confirm such a relationship. Thus, firms with higher dividends are expected to be valued higher. If dividends are used to signal instead of being viewed as an external capital market transaction, then they potentially induce a negative correlation between EEC and firm value that is unrelated to the tests of interest in this study.
in external capital raised. However, one could argue that a firm still has to inform and attract external investors, even when it only refinances an existing debt issue. Thus, I construct two separate dependent variables, one that includes only the external capital raised, and one that includes only the external capital returned to investors. Model 4 of Table III uses 
D.5. Equity versus Debt Transactions
My measure of the use of external capital does not differentiate between transactions in the debt and equity markets. According to Myers and Majluf (1984) , one would expect that information asymmetry problems have a more significant influence on raising equity than debt.
Thus, if efficient ICM firms can reduce the information asymmetry costs, the coefficient on the interaction variable between information asymmetry and ICM efficiency should be especially significant in a regression with equity issued as the dependent variable. However, as long as the debt is also risky, information asymmetry will also affect a firm's use of debt. In addition, Stulz (1990) predicts that diversified firms can have higher leverage because cash flow volatility is lower. Therefore, a testable implication of the model is that diversified firms with a larger ICM raise more debt.
I use excess increase in equity and excess increase in debt as dependent variables in models 6 and 7 to investigate the effect of ICM size and ICM efficiency on a firm's use of equity and debt. ICM efficiency is an important determinate of a firm's use of equity and debt. Both sources of external financing are significantly negatively affected by information asymmetry problems.
Also, information asymmetry costs are reduced for firms raising equity and debt. The gauge the differences in the effect of ICM efficiency on a firms use of equity or debt, I investigate the economic impact of an arbitrary change in the ratio of intangible to total assets of 0. The measures of ICM size are highly significantly related to a firm's use of debt and only marginally significantly related to a firm's use of equity. This is consistent with models predicting higher debt capacity for more diversified firms.
Taken together, the robustness tests confirm the results shown in Table II . Efficient ICM users and firms with larger ICMs are able to alleviate some of the credit constraints faced by single segment firms in transacting with the external capital markets.
E. Excess Value and Excess Net External Capital
In this section I address the question of whether a higher use of external capital also leads to a higher firm value.
Excess value is used as a proxy for firm value relative to comparable single segment firms.
Thus, the same single segment firms that make up the benchmark to compute EEC are also used to compute excess value.
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The median (mean) excess values for diversified firms are reported in Table I , panel A as -14.87% (-16.34%) using Berger and Ofek's sales multiplier method and -15.54%
(-13.37%) using Lang and Stulz's method. These means and medians are all significantly negative at the 1% level.
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I the following sections, I show regression results using the level of excess value and the changes in excess value as the dependent variable.
E.1. Excess Value: Level Regressions
The tests are based on the following model using firm i and year t: 
21 This approach has been criticized by Villalonga (2000) . She shows that excess value is biased because the diversification status is endogenous. Using a propensity score technique, she finds that, on average, diversified firms are not discounted. However, it is unclear whether the variation in excess value is affected by this new technique. Since the proposed technique would reduce the sample size drastically, I do not use Villalonga's method of computing excess value. 22 If I follow Berger and Ofek (1995) and exclude observations where excess values are less than -1.386 or more than 1.386, neither the univariate nor the regression results change significantly. Results using the Berger and Ofek asset multiplier excess value are qualitatively similar and are not reported here.
The tests should answer the question whether diversified firms that are efficient ICM users and diversified firms with a larger ICM that use more external capital than comparable single segment firms are valued higher than these single segment firms. Therefore, I include interaction variables between EEC and the measures of ICM efficiency and ICM size. Lamont and Polk (1999) find that the level of excess value is negatively correlated with the change in excess value.
To control for this, I include lagged excess value as an additional independent variable. Table IV reports firm fixed-effects regressions of equation (2). I use firm fixed-effects to alleviate concerns that the status of diversification is endogenous and to control for other unobservable cross-sectional heterogeneity (e.g. Campa and Kedia (1999) , Graham et al. (2000) , Fluck and Lynch (1999) ). In model 1 of To test whether the use of external capital by a firm with a bigger ICM is positively related to firm value, I use the inverse of the Herfindahl index and the number of segments as proxies for the degree of diversification. For ease of interpretation, I subtract one from both of these variables. In model 1, the coefficient on the inverse of the Herfindahl index is significantly negative, indicating that more-diversified firms are traded at a discount relative to less-diversified firms. More interestingly, the interaction between EEC and the inverse of the Herfindahl index is significantly positive. Similarly, in model 2, the interaction between EEC and the number of segments is significantly positive. This finding adds to Berger and Ofek (1995) and Lang and Stulz (1994) who conclude that more diversified firms trade at a higher discount by showing that the degree of diversification can be positively related to firm value if diversified firms exploit their cost advantage in raising external capital. 23 In untabulated regressions, similar results obtain if I include sales growth, log of assets and EBIT/sales as proxies for investment opportunities, size and profitability, respectively (e.g., Berger and Ofek (1995) ).
Finally, the coefficient on lagged excess value using Berger and Ofek's (1995) method is significantly positive, supporting Lamont and Polk's (1999) finding of a negative correlation between the level of excess value and the change in excess value.
In model 3, I estimate the results using Lang and Stulz's (1994) approach to computing excess value as the dependent variable. Except for the coefficient on RVA, the inferences drawn from model 1 remain unchanged. RVA, however, is not significantly related to excess value in this specification, but the interaction variable between EEC and RVADUM t-1 remains significantly positive, suggesting that more-efficient ICM users that access more external capital have higher excess value.
In this section I have considered EEC as an exogenous variable. However, the results in Table II indicate that EEC is determined by the size and efficiency of the ICM, measures of information asymmetry, capital need, relative firm valuation, and size. Therefore, it might be more appropriate to treat EEC as an endogenously determined variable. To test whether the results documented in the previous models are affected by the endogeneity of the right-hand-side variable (EEC), I run a two-stage fixed-effects regression. The first step uses model 6 from Table   II to predict EEC. 24 The predicted values include the firm fixed-effects dummy but eliminate the observation-specific residuals. The result of the second-stage regression is shown in model 4 of Table IV . The coefficient on the predicted value of EEC is positive (0.398) and significant at the 1% level. The interaction variable between the predicted value of EEC and RVADUM t-1 is 0.121 and significant at the 10% level. The coefficient on RVA, however, is insignificant. One possible explanation is that the two-stage process uses RVA in the first stage to predict EEC. Therefore, it appears that the direct effect of RVA on EEC is weaker than suggested by the models using EEC as an exogenous variable.
To summarize, diversified firms with efficient ICMs and firms with larger ICMs that use more external capital relative to their single segment peers display a significantly higher excess value.
E.2. Excess Value: Changes Regressions
An alternative to using the levels regressions above is to specify the model in terms of changes. The changes are computed as the difference in the variables between two consecutive years. As a first step, I examine whether a change in EEC is associated with a change in excess value, using the Berger and Ofek (1995) method of computing excess value. Model 1 of Table V shows results obtained from firm fixed-effects regressions with year dummies. The change in EEC is significantly positively related to the contemporaneous change in excess value. This supports the findings thus far that firms with a higher propensity to use external capital are valued higher. The change in the inverse of the Herfindahl index is negatively related to the change in excess value, supporting prior research (Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , Comment and Jarrell (1995) ) that finds that diversification is negatively correlated with excess value. However, the coefficient on the change in RVA is insignificant. This suggests that improvements in the use of the ICM do not immediately translate into higher firm value.
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The positive correlation between the change in EEC and the change in excess value raises the question of the direction of the causality. Assume for the moment that the causality is reversed, i.e., that a change in excess value causes a change in EEC. In a Myers and Majluf (1984) setting, such a relation could be justified. A test for the direction of causality can be based on the following argument. If firm value increases, it is more likely that managers will find the firm to be overvalued. According to Myers and Majluf, managers should then issue the more information-sensitive claim, i.e., equity. If firm value decreases, managers should try to issue less information-sensitive claims, namely debt. This argument then implies that the change in excess value should be more sensitive to changes in excess increase in equity than to changes in excess increase in debt.
To investigate causality, I replace the change in EEC with two variables, the change in excess increase in equity and the change in excess increase in debt. With an F-test, I test for the equality of the coefficients on change in excess increase in equity and change in excess increase in debt. Model 2 of Table V shows that the coefficient on the change in excess increase in equity is significantly smaller than the coefficient on change in excess increase in debt. This finding suggests that the direction of the causality is from EEC to excess value.
In the previous section, I used an interaction variable between EEC and RVADUM t-1 to show that the characteristics of the ICM are an important determinant of the relation between EEC and excess value. To implement such a test in the present setting, I interact the change in EEC with RVADUM t-1 . In addition, I also include the variables RVA and EEC, both lagged by one year.
Model 3 of Table V shows that coefficient on the change in RVA is positive and significant at the 10% level, whereas in model 1 the coefficient was insignificant. Further, lagged EEC as well as the change in EEC are positively related to excess value. The interaction variable between the change in EEC and RVADUM t-1 is positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that the 24 I have also used model 1 and 10 of Table II to predict excess net external capital. The inferences remain unchanged. 25 Estimating the regressions using OLS instead of firm fixed-effects yields similar results throughout.
relation between the change in the use of external capital and the change in excess value depends on the firm's ICM efficiency. The coefficient on the interaction variable between the change in EEC and the lagged inverse of the Herfindahl index is positive; however, it is not significant. This is in contrast to the finding from the levels regression reported in Table IV , where the interaction variable between EEC and the inverse of the Herfindahl index was significantly positive.
To control for the effects of capital need and relative valuation, I include in model 3 the lagged value and the change in excess internal cash flow, lagged Tobin's q and lagged excess value. The coefficient on lagged internal cash flow is significantly positive. However, the coefficient on lagged Tobin's q and lagged excess value are negative and significant. One possible interpretation of these results is that firms with more internal capital are more profitable and can increase firm value, whereas the negative correlations of lagged Tobin's q as well as lagged excess value and the change in excess value are consistent with Lamont and Polk's (1999) finding that the level of excess value is negatively related to the change in excess value.
Finally, I control for changes in the level of information asymmetry by the lagged ratio of intangible assets to total assets and the change in residual variance. I find that the coefficients on both variables are significantly negative. This is consistent with Fee and Thomas (1999) , who find that higher measures of information asymmetry are negatively related to excess value.
To see whether the coefficient on excess increase in equity is larger than the coefficient on excess increase in debt, model 4 uses excess increase in equity and excess increase in debt instead of EEC. The coefficients on the change in excess increase in equity and change in excess increase in debt are both significantly positive but are not statistically different from each other. This supports the findings from model 2 that the direction of causality is from EEC to excess value.
Model 5 of Table V shows that the valuation effect of EEC is driven primarily by excess increases in external capital. The coefficient on lagged excess increase in external capital is significantly positive, as is the coefficient on the change in excess increase in external capital. In model 6, I estimate the relation between excess decreases in external capital and the change in excess value. I do not find a significant relation between these two variables. However, I find that the coefficients of the interaction variables between excess increase (decrease) in external capital and RVADUM t-1 are significantly positive (negative). This indicates that ICM efficiency is an important determinant of firm value regardless of whether the firm raises capital or returns it to investors.
Finally, model 7 shows the regression results using Lang and Stulz's (1994) 
III. Industry Shock Sample
Theoretical models by Stein (1997) , Li and Li (1996) and others are based on the assumption that a new, positive-NPV project needs financing but the entrepreneurs' wealth and/or the firm's internal resources are insufficient to cover the initial investment. In this section, I use a smaller sample that more closely mimics the setting in which the models are specified.
A. Sample Selection
The goal of the sample selection procedure is to choose firms that receive a positive NPV project. Such firms/divisions should display an increase in Tobin's q, holding everything else constant. 26 However, Tobin's q is not observable at the segment level. Therefore, I select a sample of firms with operations in industries that have experienced a significant increase in Tobin's q. Since industry q could increase due to unexpected changes in industry cash flow, I also require that the industry cash flow remain constant.
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In order to select industries, I use only data on single segment firms. Industries are defined at the 3-digit SIC code level. To make changes in industry q comparable across industries, I
compute the change in the standardized industry median q between two consecutive years. The standardized industry median q is defined as follows:
where q t is the industry median q at time t, q is the time-series average of industry median qs, and q σ is the standard deviation of the time-series of industry median qs. To control for the industry cash flow, I compute a standardized industry median cash flow measure defined as:
26 That is, if the market sees a positive chance that the project will be realized or sold. 27 Lamont (1997) , Blanchard et al. (1994) and Harford and Haushalter (1999) employ event study methodologies to investigate the effect of shocks to cash flow on firms' use of funds. Blanchard et al. (1994) and Harford and Haushalter (1999) analyze how firms transact with the ECM after the shock. However, they do not explore whether differences exist between single segment and diversified firms.
where cf t is the industry median cash-flow-to-assets ratio at time t, cf is the time-series average of the industry median cash-flow-to-assets ratio and cf σ is the standard deviation of the time-series of industry median cash-flow-to-assets ratios.
An industry is determined to have experienced a positive q shock if the change in the standardized industry median q exceeds 1.25, and the change in the standardized industry median cash flow is between -0.25 and + 0.25. 28 The rational for using industry level qs instead of firmlevel qs is that changes in firm q could reflect the market's view of idiosyncratic changes, such as managerial mistakes, which do not generally alter the set of investment opportunities. Industrylevel changes should better reflect changes in industry investment opportunities and industry cash flow, thus allowing for a better control for expected capital needs. Using this procedure, I obtain 59 three-digit SIC code industries with a positive q shock during 1980-1998. Appendix 2 lists all the sample-industries by event year and the change in their standardized industry q and cash flow.
A concern with this sample selection procedure is whether new firms entering the sample could be responsible for the large increase in industry q. Appendix 2 shows that this is unlikely because the number of single segment firms used to compute the annual standardized values is very stable.
My sample uses diversified firms that have a segment in at least one of the industries that experience a positive q shock. In addition, the sample selection criteria in section II are also observed. I require that the selected diversified firms have at least one segment in the industry with a positive q shock one year prior to the shock. This results in a sample of 390 diversified firms with 497 segments in one of the selected industries. Appendix 2 shows the number of segments per industry-year.
I first investigate whether characteristics of a firm's ICM help to explain the use of external capital, given the exogenous shock to investment opportunities and controlling for differences in the availability of internal cash flow. I then examine the relation between the use of external capital and excess firm value.
B. Determinants of the Use of External Capital
The research design in this section focuses on changes in the use of external capital by diversified firms relative to comparable single segment firms. I measure changes as the difference 28 The cut off values of 1.25, -0.25 and 0.25 are arbitrary. If I assume a normal distribution of q, then my standardization procedure computes a standard normal variable where the value 1.25 corresponds to the 10 th percentile using a one-tailed test. However, since I use the change between two standardized values, the probability is path dependent. To avoid inadvertently picking up industries that recover from a very low realization of the standardized q, I compute the standardized industry median q and cash flow in the year of the shock t (see Appendix 2). The average standardized industry median q across all industries in the year of the shock is 0.97, and no industry has a standardized q below -0.22. between the values at t-1, the year before the industry shock, and t, the end of the year in which the industry shock occurred.
B.1. Factors, Proxies and Predicted Effect
An increase in a segment's investment opportunities should lead headquarters to allocate more resources to that segment. Firms that, relative to their single segment peers, allocate more capital to the industries with an increase in q should be able to use more external capital and increase firm value. I use the change in RVA from t-1 to t as a proxy for the change in internal allocation and its efficiency.
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In the following analysis, I re-estimate equation (1) and use the proxies described in section 3. However, I do not include firm q as a proxy for capital needs, 30 and instead of using firm size, I
use the ratio of the segment assets in the positive q shock industry to total assets ('hit-size'). A positive coefficient on hit-size would indicate that firms that have a larger fraction of their assets in one of the positive q shock industries (i.e., a diversified firm that is more like a single segment firm) display a greater increase in their use of external capital than diversified firms with only few assets in a positive q shock industry. I control for the need for capital by including the change in excess internal cash flow. In all three models, I find a significant negative coefficient. This suggests that firms that increase internal funding, ceteris paribus, reduce the use of external capital. To control for a firm's relative valuation, I include the annual stock return between t-1and t. The coefficient is not significantly different from zero, suggesting that relative valuation does not help to explain a firm's change in the use of external capital. The coefficient on the variable hit-size is also insignificant, indicating that the relative size of the segment that operates in a positive q shock industry does not seem to influence the use of external capital. 30 The inferences do not change, however, even if I include Tobin's q. 31 In section 3, I used the lagged ratio of intangible to total assets as my main measure of information asymmetry. However, using the change in the ratio could result in a reversed causality problem if firms raise external capital to make an acquisition and use the purchase method of accounting. This increases intangibles and a positive relation between changes in EEC and changes in the ratio of intangible to total assets would be observed.
B.2. Results
C. Changes in Excess Value and Changes in Excess Net External Capital
C.1. Factors, Proxies and Predicted Effect
The dependent variable in this specification is the change in excess value between t-1 and t computed, following Berger and Ofek (1995) . 32 The main variables of interest are the change in EEC and interaction variables between EEC and measures of ICM efficiency and ICM size. In model 1, the coefficient on the change in the inverse of the Herfindahl index is negative but insignificant. The coefficient on the change in the coefficient of variation in q is positive and significant at the 10% level in model 1 and significant at the 5% level in model 2, where an additional interaction variable between the change in EEC and the coefficient of variation in q at t-1 is included. The coefficient on the interaction variable is positive but insignificant. The proxies of ICM size indicate that firms with segments that are less correlated with each other in 32 Qualitatively similar results are obtained if the Lang and Stulz's (1994) method is used (not shown). 33 Since the industry shock sample includes no firm in two consecutive years, tests in this section are less likely to be influenced by possible estimation bias introduced by uncontrolled time-series correlation.
C.2. Results
terms of investment opportunities and hence capital needs, can increase their firm value.
However, the change in the use of external capital plays an insignificant role in this relation. In addition to including extra interaction variables, model 2 also expands on the control variables relative to model 1 by including lagged excess value. The coefficient on this variable is significantly negative and is in line with the findings of Lamont and Polk (1999) and the results shown in Table V .
In model 3, I include additional control variables for the internally generated cash flow, information asymmetry and size. To test whether the lagged level of any exogenous variable influences the change in excess value, I also include the values of the independent variables at t-1. The inferences drawn from models 1 and 2 are unaffected by these additional control variables. Interestingly, the coefficients on lagged EEC as well as on the change in EEC are positive and significant at the 1% level. This suggests that a firm that has used more external capital in the year prior to the shock can increase excess value. One possible interpretation is that firms that raise external capital still have capital that they can invest in the following year, thus benefiting more from the positive industry q shock.
In summary, an increase in use of external capital is associated with an increase in excess value. This relation is more pronounced for firms with efficient ICMs. These findings are from a sample of diversified firms that are likely to be in need of external capital in order to avoid underinvestment and they support the inferences drawn in section 3.
IV. Conclusions
This study examines the interaction between internal and external capital markets.
Understanding how characteristics of the internal capital market influence the use of external capital can help us better understand the costs and benefits of diversification. Many studies about diversification show that more diversified firms have a lower excess value (e.g., Lang and Stulz (1994) , Berger and Ofek (1995) , Comment and Jarrell (1995) ). I find a more complex relationship. Firms that are more diversified and hence have a larger ICM use more external capital. Among a sample of Compustat firms from the years 1980-1998, more-diversified firms are traded at a higher discount. However, if they use more external capital than comparable single segment firms, the discount actually decreases with diversification. I find that efficient ICM firms use more external capital than comparable single segment firms. Efficient ICM users can also overcome some of the information asymmetry problems in raising external capital. Since the use of external capital is positively related to excess value, especially for efficient ICM firms and firms with a larger ICM, my analysis highlights an additional benefit of a large and efficient ICM, namely a lower-cost access to external capital.
These findings are robust to different regression techniques and proxies for use of external capital. The conclusions drawn are also unaffected if the sample is restricted to diversified firms that have a division in an industry with a positive q shock, thus mimicking more closely a setting in which a firm needs external financing to realize new, positive-NPV projects. This suggests a partial answer to Zingales's (2000) question about the factors that determine a firm's ability to capture new growth opportunities. My study shows the importance of a firm's ICM characteristics in financing and thus capturing new growth opportunities.
The result that the median diversified firm uses less external capital than comparable single segment firms supports Williamson (1970 Williamson ( , 1975 Williamson ( , 1986 . However, the finding that more efficient ICM users raise more external capital seems to contradict Williamson's notion that internal and external capital markets are substitutes. His argument implies that efficient ICM users would transact less in the external capital markets and that transacting less is valuable. My results clearly support Stein (1997) , who formalizes and extends Williamson's argument and predicts that more efficient ICM firms and firms with larger ICMs use more external capital and have a higher firm value. The evidence presented here partly supports Matsusaka and Nanda (2000) in that internal capital is a major factor determining a firm's use of external capital. However, this study's finding that the firms with a greater use of external capital are valued higher can only be reconciled with their theory if firms were, on average, short on internal capital relative to the capital needed for optimal investment.
Taking a broader view, this study adds to research about decisions made in hierarchies (ICMs) and markets (ECMs). Coase (1937) argues that firms exist because transactions are less costly if made internally than externally, and Rajan et al. (2000) conclude that there are important differences between hierarchies and markets. The results here demonstrate that there are significant feedback effects from hierarchies to markets. Firms that choose to transact in a hierarchy also change their ability to transact in markets.
Future research is also needed to learn more about the determinants of ICM characteristics such as allocational efficiency and ICM size. For example, work by Gertner et al. (1994 ), Stein (1997 , Scharfstein and Stein (2000) and Rajan et al. (2000) suggests that agency problems are a major determinant of ICM efficiency. However, it is also conceivable that industry characteristics are an important factor affecting allocational efficiency (e.g., Lamont and Polk (2000) ). Results of such research could help us to better identify the source of inefficiencies in the use of ICMs and further illuminate the interaction between external and internal capital markets.
Appendix 1 Description of Variables
MEASURES OF USE OF EXTERNAL CAPITAL Excess Net External Capital (EEC)
Net external capital = #108-#115+#111-#114+#301 (net common and preferred stock issued minus net long-term debt issued plus changes in short-term debt).
Numbers with #, refer to Compustat items.
Excess net external capital = (net external capital -imputed net external capital) / lagged book value of assets [or standardized by lagged market value = market value of common equity plus book value of assets minus book value of common equity minus deferred taxes]. Imputed net external capital is computed as the segment sales (or asset) weighted sum of the median net external capital to sales (assets) ratio of single segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code industry as the segment of the diversified firm. Sales-weighting is the standard.
Excess Net External Capital Including Dividends and Interest
Net external capital is defined as #108-#115+#111-#114+#301-#127-#15 (net common and preferred stock issued minus net long-term debt issued plus changes in short-term debt minus cash dividends minus interest paid). Excess net external capital is computed as above.
Excess Net External Capital Including Asset Sales
Net external capital is defined as #108-#115+#111-#114+#301+#107+#109 +#309+#310+#312 (net common and preferred stock issued minus net long-term debt issued plus changes in short-term debt plus sale of PP&E plus sale of investments plus sales of short-term investments plus sales of investing activities plus increases in other financing activities). Excess net external capital is computed as above.
Excess Increase in External Capital
Increase in external capital is defined as #108+#111+#301 (if positive). Excess increase in external capital is computed the same way as excess net external capital.
Excess Decrease in External Capital
Decrease in external capital is defined as #115+#114+#310 (if negative). If dividends and interest are included, then #127+#15 are added. Excess decrease in external capital is computed the same way as excess net external capital.
Excess Increase in Equity
Increase in equity is defined as #108 (common and preferred stock issued).
Computing excess increase in equity follows the same steps as EEC.
Excess Increase in Debt
Inrease in debt is defined as #111 (long-term debt). Computing excess increase in debt follows the same steps as EEC. where n is the number of segments and j refers to the segment.
MEASURES OF ICM SIZE
Number of Segments
The number of segments a firm reports. Firms reporting more than five segments are assigned the value five.
Coefficient of Variation in q
The coefficient of variation in q is defined as the standard deviation of imputed segment qs divided by the average imputed segment q. , where w j is segment js share of total assets, q j is imputed q, n is the number of segments and wq is the average asset weighted q j . w j and q j are beginning-of-the-period values. , where Capex is capital expenditures, q is imputed Tobin's q, n is the number of segments, BA is firm assets, BA j is segment assets and Capex j ss /BA j ss is the median capex/asset ratio for the single segment firms in the corresponding industry. w j is the ratio of segment assets to firm assets. BA, w j and q j are beginning-of-the-period values. where Capex is capital expenditures, q j is beginning-of-the-period median Tobin's q of single segment firms in that operate in the same 3-digit industry as segment j, q is the average of segment qs for the firm and n is the number of segments.
MEASURES OF ICM EFFICIENCY
MEASURES OF CAPITAL NEED
Tobin's q Tobin's q is the market-to-book ratio, where market value is computed as the market value of common equity plus book value of assets minus book value of common equity minus deferred taxes. 
MEASURES OF INFORMATION ASYMMETRY
Residual Variance Residual variance is computed over a calendar year by using daily returns and a market model with the value-weighted CRSP index, including dividends as the market return. Variance is not annualized. Total Variance Total variance is computed over a calendar year using the daily stock returns, including distributions. Variance is not annualized. Intangible Assets / Total Assets Compustat item #33/#6 Standardized Analysts' Forecast Dispersion
The numerator is computed as the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts of the firm's one-year ahead fiscal year-end earnings per share (stdev). The denominator is the absolute value of the mean of the forecasts (meanest). Variables are from IBES.
MEASURES OF RELATIVE VALUATION
Excess Value (Berger and Ofek, 1995) Excess value =
where V is the sum of market value of equity and book value of assets less the book value of equity and deferred taxes, I(V) is the imputed firm value, Sales i is the segment i's sales, M i (V/Sales) MS is the sales multiplier (calculated as the median of the single segment firms in the same 3-digit SIC code industry), and n is the number of segments per firm. Excess Value (Lang and Stulz, 1994) Log of the ratio of the firm's actual Tobin's q at the end of the year to the sum of segment sales-weighted imputed qs.
Annual Stock Return
Total return over a calendar year. Description of the Industry Shock Sample
Industries are selected based on single segment firms only and industries are defined at the 3-digit SIC code level. I select industries based on the change in the standardized industry median q and the change in the standardized industry median cash flow, which are defined as follows:
where q t is the industry median q at time t, q is the time-series average of industry median qs and q σ is the standard deviation of the time-series of industry median qs. Firm fixed-effects regressions with year dummies (not reported). The dependent variable is excess net external capital. The Herfindahl index is based on sales. The number of segments range from 1 to 5, where 5 includes firms with 5-10 segments. RVADUM t-1 = 1 if RVA ≥ 0 at t-1. The addition, t-1, means that the one year lagged value of the variable is used. For other variable definitions see Appendix 1. The absolute value of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** corresponding to 10%, 5%, 1% significance levels. All the data are for the period 1980-1998. Model 7 only uses diversified firms with the same number of segments in two consecutive years. Model 8 only includes firms with available information on the standard deviation of analysts' forecasts reported in IBES.
Excess Net External Capital
Model
(1) Fama-MacBeth (1973) type regressions run cross-sectionally, year-by-year. From each observation, the time-series average of the variable is subtracted before running the regressions. Models 2-7 use firm fixed-effects (FE) with year dummies (not reported) and different dependent variables. Excess increase in equity is the difference between common and preferred stock issued (Compustat item 108) by the diversified firm minus the imputed equity issued, standardized by lagged book value of assets. Excess increase in debt is the difference between long-term debt issued (Compustat item 111) by the diversified firm minus the imputed long-term debt issued, standardized by lagged book value of assets. The Herfindahl index is based on sales. The number of segments ranges from 1 to 5, where 5 includes firms with 5-10 segments. RVADUM t-1 = 1 if RVA ≥ 0 at t-1, where t-1 indicates that the one year lagged value of the variable is used. For other variable definitions see Appendix 1. In models 2, 6 and 7, excess internal cash flow includes interest and dividends (see Appendix 1 for a more detailed definition). For models 2-7, the absolute value of the heteroskedasticity robust tstatistics are reported in parentheses. The significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** corresponding to 10%, 5%, 1% levels. All the data are for the period 1980-1998. Berger and Ofek's (1995) sales multiplier method or according to Lang and Stulz's (1994) method. The Herfindahl index is based on sales. The number of segments range from 1 to 5, where 5 includes firms with 5-10 segments. RVADUM t-1 = 1 if RVA ≥ 0 at t-1, where t-1 indicates that the one year lagged value of the variable is used. For other variable definitions see Appendix 1. The absolute values of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** corresponding to 10%, 5%, 1% levels. All the data are for the period 1980-1998. Berger and Ofek's (1995) sales multiplier method for models 1-6 and according to Lang and Stulz's (1994) method in model 7. The Herfindahl index is based on sales. The number of segments range from 1 to 5, where 5 includes firms with 5-10 segments. RVADUM t-1 = 1 if RVA ≥ 0 at t-1, where t-1 indicates that the one year lagged value of the variable is used. Excess increase in equity is the difference between common and preferred stock issued (Compustat item 108) by the diversified firm minus the imputed equity issued, standardized by lagged book value of assets. Excess increase in debt is the difference between long-term debt issued (Compustat item 111) by the diversified firm minus the imputed long-term debt issued, standardized by lagged book value of assets. For other variable definitions see Appendix 1. The changes are computed between two consecutive years for all independent variables. The variable ∆ EEC is the change in excess net external capital. In conjunction with the interaction variable ( ∆ EEC * RVADUM t-1 ), ∆ EEC stands for for change in excess net external capital in models 3 and 7; in model 5, ∆ EEC stands for increase in external capital and in model 6 for decrease in external capital, respectively. In models 2 and 4-6, the variable excess internal cash flow includes dividends and interest (see Appendix 1 for details). The absolute value of the heteroskedasticity robust t-statistics are reported in parentheses. The significance levels are indicated by *, **, *** corresponding to 10%, 5%, 1% levels. Significance levels of F-tests between the coefficients on ∆ Equity and ∆ Debt are reported on the second line next to the t-statistics. An a indicates a significant difference of the coefficients at the 1% level using an F-test. All the data are for the period 1980-1998. Univariate statistics of diversified firms, which have at least one segment in the industry classified as experiencing a positive q shock. An industry is determined to have experienced a positive q shock if the change in the standardized q is greater or equal to 1.25 and the change in the standardized industry cash flow is between -0.25 and + 0.25. For a more detailed description of the sample selection procedure see Appendix 2. For definitions of the variables, see Appendix 1. Medians are reported on the first line, means are reported on the second line in italics. Firms are classified as efficient if the relative value of allocation (RVA) in year t-1 is at least zero. Firms with a value below zero are classified as inefficient. The significance levels for means and medians are indicated by *, **, *** corresponding to 10%, 5% and 1%. OLS regressions using the industry shock sample for the period 1980-1998. Year dummies are not reported. The dependent variable is the change in excess net external capital ( ∆ EEC). All the changes are measured between t-1 and t, where t is the end of the year in which the industry shock occurred. Excess Value is computed according to Berger and Ofek's (1995) sales multiplier method. The Herfindahl index is based on sales. RVADUM t-1 = 1 if RVA ≥ 0 at t-1. Hit-size is the ratio of segment(s) assets (segments that belong to the shocked industry) to total assets of the firm. For other variable definitions see Appendix 1. On the first line the coefficients are reported with their significance level indicated by *, **, *** corresponding to 10%, 5% and 1% significance based on White-adjusted standard errors. The absolute values of the tstatistics are reported in brackets underneath. Berger and Ofek's (1995) sales multiplier method. The variable ∆ EEC is the change in excess net external capital. The Herfindahl index is based on sales. RVADUM t-1 = 1 if RVA ≥ 0 at t-1. Hit-size is the ratio of segment(s) assets (segments that belong to the shocked industry) to total assets of the firm. For other variable definitions see Appendix 1. On the first line the coefficients are reported with their significance level indicated by *, **, *** corresponding to 10%, 5% and 1% significance based on White-adjusted standard errors. The absolute values of the t-statistics are reported in brackets underneath. 
Dependent
